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ANTITRUST AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
RICHARD W. MCLAREN
This article was adapted from a speech delivered by Assistant
Attorney General McLaren before the Investment Bankers
Association of America on October 29, 1969 in New ,York
City. Mr. McLaren's remarks are particularly relevant to the
specialized coverage of this issue as he highlights a number of
significant contemporary legal problems in the areas of secu-
rities law and trade regulation.
Over the years, the securities industry has been fairly unaware
of antitrust, or else has regarded it with a high degree of disinterest.
Of late—like the pretty girl on her first trip to Italy—the industry
has developed not only an awareness, but a painful alertness to the
"pinch" of antitrust.
Or, to thoroughly mix metaphors, antitrust may well be regarded
as a brash interloper. After all, there is a vast age difference between
the securities industry and the onset of antitrust laws; investment
banking is nearly as old as commerce itself, and the securities industry
has been with us since the Nation was founded; antitrust is of rela-
tively recent vintage, and, like any newcomer, is sometimes viewed
with suspicion and apprehension.
In spite of this distrust, it should be recognized that the relation-
ship can be profitable for both the securities industry and those that
are authorized to enforce the antitrust laws. Both share a common
goal—to make the securities markets in this country as efficient as
they can be. This is a matter of great importance, not only to the
securities industry, but also to the country as a whole. It is also a
difficult matter, as it is always difficult to adapt institutions from
the tranquility of a quieter past to the needs of a demanding future.
In this regard, the securities industry must realize that the antitrust
laws have an important contribution to make here.
I. THE Silver CASE
The Antitrust Division's interest in the securities industry began
with the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in the now-famed case of
Silver v. New York Stock Exch.' Mr. Silver, a broker who was not a
member of the New York Stock Exchange, had a private business wire
connecting his office with those of several New York Stock Exchange
member firms. A committee of the Exchange, composed of other mem-
1 373 U.S. 341 (1963). For discussions of the applicability of Silver to recent anti-
trust cases, see Comment, The Liability of Private Accrediting Associations Under the
Sherman Act, the Constitution, and the Common Law, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 285,
297-9S (1970) and 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 332, 333-34 (1970).
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ber firms, collectively decided that Silver's private wires should be dis-
continued. Without granting Silver a hearing, they directed the member
firms to terminate Silver's connection. Silver claimed that this was a
boycott in violation of the antitrust laws, and the Supreme Court
agreed.
The rule of that case became applicable to antitrust efforts in the
securities field: Anticompetitive activities of stock exchange members
are subject to the antitrust laws unless the activities are necessary to
achieve a legitimate goal of the Securities Exchange Ace
II. FIXED BROKER COMMISSION RATES
One of the most difficult problems concerns the application of
the Silver principle to particular practices in the securities industry—
most notably, the fixed commission rate system. 3
 The question is
whether rate fixing and related practices are necessary to achieve a
legitimate goal of the Exchange Act. If they are necessary, then they
are legal; if they are not necessary, then they are subject to the Sher-
man Act, just like any other agreement in restraint of trade. The
question of "necessity" is a matter of evidence, not emotion.
The customer-directed "give-up" of brokerage commissions,
whereby one broker gave up some of his fixed commission to another,
had demonstrated that brokerage commissions were fixed at far too
high a level, at least for the large institutional investor. Some brokerage
firms had been able to give away 70 percent of their commissions and
still make a large profit.
The complex "give-up" mechanisms which were needed in order
to comply with the non-rebate rules of the various stock exchanges
ranged from the bizarre to outright chicanery. "Give-ups" totalling
millions of dollars were ending up in mysterious Swiss bank accounts,'
and even in the hands of a clever woman in the Bahamas, who was
characterized as a "simple housewife." The SEC decided that it was
time to investigate the commission "give-up" practices and issued a
notice of inquiry asking for comments from interested parties.
Since it appeared to the Antitrust Division that most of the evils
of the "give-up" could be eliminated if competitive principles were
applied to the fixed rate structure, it filed a memorandum with the
SEC suggesting that the Commission hold hearings to determine
2 373 U.S. at 364.
3 See, e.g., Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
72,911, at 86, 468 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 1969), noted in 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
332 (1970).
4
 For discussion of the use of secret Swiss bank accounts by United States citizens
to evade United States securities laws, see Comment, Secret Swiss Bank Accounts as a
Mechanism for Violating United States Securities Laws: An Analysis of Proposed Solu-
tions, II B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 194 (1970).
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whether price fixing was necessary to make the Exchange Act work.
The SEC then ordered hearings, which are still in progress.
At the close of the first phase of those hearings, the stock ex-
changes agreed to outlaw the "give-up" and reduce the fixed rates on
large transactions. That rate reduction is estimated to have saved
the investing public $150 million annually. Nevertheless, the Antitrust
Division has argued to the SEC that more competition in brokerage
rates would not only be in the public interest but would result in even
greater earnings and redound to the ultimate benefit of the industry.
The chief benefit from competitive commission rates would be
rates—at the wholesale as well as retail level—which more nearly
approximate the cost of providing the service. This would eliminate
the pressure for the customer-directed "give-up," as well as reciprocity
arrangements, both of which can only work when commission rates are
fixed at a higher level than the free market would set them. This would
also be a start toward getting down to the fighting trim which the
industry is going to need if it is to survive the onslaught of the com-
puter market—which soon may succeed the so called "third market"
in drawing off the volume business which can and will be handled at
a lower, cost-justified rate than is now available.
Another benefit from competitive rates would be the separation
of charges for the various services provided by the brokerage firm.
Under the present fixed-fee system, the customer may pay for research
and promotional services whether he wants them or not. In a corn-
petitive market, the customer would have the choice of paying for
ancillary services only when he needs them.
A third benefit would be to improve the overall performance of
the central securities market as a whole, not simply the New York
Stock Exchange. In other words, competitive rates on the Exchange
will reduce the incentives to non-members, including large institutions,
to trade off the Exchange whenever possible. Such rates will also elim-
inate the need to discourage members from trading off the 'floor in
order to protect an artificial rate structure.
These membership and access questions were discussed at some
length in the Antitrust Division's brief filed with the SEC this past
January. Suffice it to say that, standing alone, they raise some serious
antitrust questions; and, under Silver, they would not be allowed to
stand unless they could be shown to be necessary to make the Securi-
ties Exchange Act work.
It should be explained that there is a general antitrust rule that,
when a private group controls access to a market, it must grant access
to that market on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis to all those
in the trade. This rule has been specifically applied by the courts to
tobacco and other produce markets as well as to such other diverse
189
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enterprises as the Associated Press' and the St. Louis Terminal Rail-
way.' Leaving any possible question of necessity to be determined by
the SEC, the rule of these cases seems to have equal application to
the New York Stock Exchange.
Physical limitations such as, for example, floor space, may require
limitations on membership, but such factors would not seem to justify
a highly preferential rate to an individual or firm just because he or
it happens to be a "member." Competitive rates would solve this prob-
lem because "members" and "non-members" alike would secure broker-
age and clearing at rates close to the approximate cost of the services
involved.
III. STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP
The question of membership limitations has also been brought
to the fore by another recent development—the NYSE proposal to
permit wider public ownership of broker-dealer member corporations.
While the Antitrust Division welcomes this proposal because it poten-
tially opens up stock exchange membership to a larger class of partici-
pants and paves the way for the infusion of needed capital into the
Exchange community, it is somewhat disturbed by the conditions
which are obviously designed to prevent institutional investors from
gaining membership on the Exchange.
The pressure for institutional membership would largely disap-
pear if, as advocated, commission rates for institutional investors were
determined by the forces of competition. Conversely, it seems inevita-
ble that so long as fixed rates, as well as rules designed to exclude in-
stitutions, continue in effect, giving the appearance of benefitting the
existing membership at the expense of mutual fund investors, pressure
on the rates, the rules and indeed on the whole structure of the NYSE
must be expected to continue. In all candor, a "private club" approach
to exchange membership appears to be short-sighted as well as con-
trary both to the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the principles of the antitrust laws.
But whether the Antitrust Division is right on these issues or not,
it is only the advocate; matters are now in the hands of the SEC
which is the court and, at least in the first instance, must determine
these issues. The Antitrust Division is anxious that the Commission
resolve these questions, particularly the fixed rate issue, as rapidly as
possible. For one thing, it would indeed be unfortunate if member
corporations were to sell their stock to the public before the Commis-
sion decided whether the way they conduct their business may be con-
tinued.
5 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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It should be emphasized that SEC approval of fixed rates has its
drawbacks as well as its advantages. If fixed rates are upheld, the
industry must accept the burden of regulation along with its presumed
advantages.
The view of the Antitrust Division is that antitrust serves as a
preferable alternative to ever-increasing government regulation. The
American public long ago determined that if the free market did not
function well as an economic regulator, government must do the regu-
lating. The function of the Antitrust Division is to keep the free mar-
ket mechanism operating so that government regulation will be held
to an absolute minimum. The drama now being played out before the
SEC presents the rather curious spectacle of a government agency—
in this case, the Department of Justice—arguing for free market com-
petition, and private business—in this case the stock exchanges—bat-
tling in effect for government price regulation. As a firm believer in
competition, it is submitted that if the exchanges win the battle, they
may lose the war.
IV. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The Antitrust Division's perspective on the new multi-industry
corporations stresses three considerations. First, it is not opposed to
conglomerate firms as such, new or old; it recognizes there is much
to be said for them. It is not even opposed to conglomerate acquisi-
tions. In fact, it would welcome foothold acquisitions by the con-
glomerates in concentrated industries, since this would aid competition.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act7 outlaws mergers which threaten com-
petition. And there is no question whatsoever that section 7 is intended
to apply with as much force to conglomerate mergers as to traditional
horizontal and vertical mergers, where the effect is anticompetitive.
Congress made that abundantly clear when it enacted the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 8 in 1950.
Second, the enforcement efforts of the Antitrust Division repre-
sent no radical departure from established law; such factors as the
elimination of potential competition, the creation of the power to
engage in reciprocity, the entrenchment of a leading firm in a con-
centrated market, the triggering of additional mergers, have been
specifically recognized by the Supreme Court as grounds for enjoining
conglomerate mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and these
factors are set forth in the Merger Guidelines issued by the Johnson
Administration. Thus, it is fair to say that the efforts of the Division
have been very careful. Indeed, it has filed but five conglomerate
merger cases—all of which are solidly grounded in these established
precedents.
7 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
8 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
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Finally, the Division believes that the pace and scale of the
merger trend as it existed in the Spring of 1969—with more and more
giant firms merging with one another, or acquiring leading firms in
smaller industries—could have been ignored only at the risk of serious
and perhaps irreversible damage to the competitive economy. Such a
trend is precisely the kind of danger that Congress clearly legislated
against in amending section 7 in 1950. It is the Division's assigned
task to insure that such danger is averted by the bringing of lawsuits
to enjoin or undo anticompetitive mergers. A side effect of such activity,
in enforcement theory at least, is to develop a deterrent. To the extent
that the Division is not able to deal with anticompetitive mergers on
this case by case basis, remedial, and much more rigidly repressive,
anti-merger legislation should be expected.
It is too early to assess the Division's program. It clearly has not
put an end to merger activity; it has not prevented outsiders from
breaking into new markets, nor has it prevented those who wished
to do so from selling out. Indeed, mergers are currently continuing at
a record rate. It does appear, however, that fewer mergers involve
combinations of giant firms, or acquisitions of leading firms in one
market by very large firms in other markets—the types of Mergers
which the Supreme Court has ruled anticompetitive, and against which
the Division has moved in its five cases. Whatever the cause, the trend
seems to be a constructive one.
One final observation: there have been some charges that the
Division is trying to frustrate the growth aspirations of the newer
conglomerate companies, and to protect "The Establishment." This is
simply not true. The Division is entirely uninterested in who may
end up in control of a combination of companies; its interest is
strictly in preventing their union if it is an anticompetitive one,
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